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CASENOTES 
BANKRUPTCY - TRUSTEE MAY NOT ABANDON PROPERTY 
IN CONTRAVENTION OF A STATE STATUTE OR REGULA-
TION THAT IS DESIGNED TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC FROM 
IDENTIFIED HAZARDS. Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey De-
partment of Environmental Protection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986). 
A waste oil processing company! accepted oil contaminated with 
toxic carcinogens2 in violation of New Jersey's environmental laws. 3 The 
company filed for bankruptcy under a chapter 11 reorganization pro-
ceeding, and subsequently converted the reorganization to a chapter 7 
liquidation proceeding under the Federal Bankruptcy Code.4 The 
trustee, utilizing the abandonment powers of section 554(a), gave notice 
of his intention to abandon the contaminated oil. 5 The state objected, 
contending that the abandonment would violate state and federal envi-
ronmental laws, and would pose a threat to public health and safety be-
1. The name of the company is Quanta Resources Corporation ("Quanta"). Quanta 
was incorporated in Delaware in March 1980. In July of 1980, Quanta entered into 
an agreement to acquire Edgewater Terminals, Inc., which operated a facility for 
processing waste oil and oil sludge. Quanta also operated a waste oil processing 
facility in Long Island City, New York. Brieffor Petitioner at S-6, Midlantic Nat'l 
Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986) (No. 84-801). 
2. Quanta was operating the facility under a "Temporary Operating Authorization" 
("TOA") issued by the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection 
("NJDEP"). In August of 1980, Quanta received an administrative order from the 
NJDEP to repair serious maintenance problems. In May of 1981, the NJDEP or-
dered Quanta to remove all sludge from the site, improve maintenance procedures, 
and rectify the chronic spills and leaks at the facility. An injunction was also or-
dered, exnressly prohibiting the facility from accepting oil contaminated with 
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), a toxic carcinogen. A month later, on June 23, 
1981, NJDEP investigators tested Quanta's tanks and discovered unlawful concen-
trations of PCBs. Brief for Respondent at 3-4, Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey 
Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986) (No. 84-801). 
3. The illegal concentration of PCBs in Quanta's tanks was in contravention of the 
Spill Compensation and Control Act, codified at sections S8: 10-23.11 to -23.11z of 
the New Jersey Statutes Annotated (West 1982 & Supp. 1988) and the Solid Waste 
Management Act, found at sections 13:IE-l to -116 of the New Jersey Statutes An-
notated (West 1979 & Supp. 1988). 
Environmental investigators also found illegal concentrations of toxic waste at 
the company's Long Island City facility in violation of New York law. This case-
note, however, deals primarily with the violations of the New Jersey statutes. 
4. On October 6, 1981, Quanta filed a voluntary petition for reorganization under 
chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. The next day, the NJDEP directed the com-
pany to remove all hazardous waste, including all material contaminated with 
PCBs, and to prepare and execute a closure plan for the facility. One month later, 
the company converted the reorganization petition to a liquidation proceeding 
under chapter 7. Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 
474 U.S. 494, 497 (1986). 
S. On October 8, 1982, the trustee filed the first of a series of notices proposing the 
abandonment of the PCB-laden waste oil at the New Jersey facility. Brief for Peti-
tioner, supra note 1, at 8. The trustee claimed that the contaminated property was 
burdensome and of inconsequential value to the estate, and therefore may be aban-
doned pursuant to section SS4(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 
497; see also 11 U.S.C. § SS4(a) (1982). 
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cause of the uncontrolled toxic chemical discharge leaking out of the 
tanks.6 The bankruptcy court permitted the abandonment and the fed-
eral district court affirmed.7 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
reversed the district court's ruling. 8 On certiorari, the Supreme Court 
affirmed the Third Circuit's ruling and held that a trustee in a chapter 7 
liquidation proceeding may not abandon hazardous waste if doing so vio-
lates a state environmentallaw.9 
Proper disposal of hazardous waste is a relatively recent concern. 10 
Chemical and waste industries produce an overwhelming quantity of 
toxic· waste each year. I I There are approximately 28,000 abandoned 
toxic waste sites in the United Statesl2 that present a variety ofhazards,13 
and are very expensive to clean Up.14 To combat this crisis, the states 
and the federal government have enacted legislation to control the dump-
6. In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 912, 924 (1984); see infra notes 14-15 (fed-
eral statutes regarding hazardous waste). 
7. In re Quanta Resources Corp., 55 Bankr. 696 (Banke. D.N.I. 1983), aff'd, 739 F.2d 
912 (3d Cir. 1984). 
8. In re Quanta, 739 F.2d at 921-22. Midlantic National Bank ("Midlantic"), 
Quanta's largest creditor, appealed the decision of the court of appeals to the 
Supreme Court. On June 3, 1981, five days after receiving its TOA from the 
NJDEP, Quanta borrowed $600,000 from Midlantic for working capital. Quanta 
executed and perfected a note and a security agreement with Midlantic granting 
them a security interest in Quanta's inventory, accounts receivable and several items 
of equipment. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at 6. Midlantic argued that imple-
mentation of the Third Circuit's decision would force the trustee to use all of the 
company's assets to clean up the hazardous waste site, leaving nothing for its se-
cured creditors. Id. at 15. 
9. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 507. 
10. See Davis, Discouraging Dumping: The California Example, in BEYOND DUMPING: 
NEW STRATEGIES FOR CONTROLLING TOXIC CONTAMINATION 71 (B. Piasecki ed. 
1984). In the past, American industry has put their lead, mercury, chlorinated hy-
drocarbons, PCBs and other poisons into the ground without consideration of its 
future impact. See Piasecki, Beyond Dumping: An Overview and Introduction, in 
BEYOND DUMPING, supra, at xiii. 
11. Two hundred and seventy-five million metric tons of toxic waste are produced annu-
ally. Telephone interview with Robin Woods, Spokeswoman of the Environmental 
Protection Agency Press Office (Feb. 3, 1988). 
12. Id.; see also U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HAZARDOUS WASTE, ENVIRON-
MENTAL SAFEGUARDS JEOPARDIZED WHEN FACILITIES CEASE OPERATING 18 
(1986) [hereinafter "U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE"]' 
13. S. EPSTEIN, L. BROWN & C. POPE, HAZARDOUS WASTE IN AMERICA 26-27 (1984). 
Hazards presented by these toxic wastes include contamination of soil and ground 
water, destruction of indigenous plant and animal habitats, air-pollution, fires, and a 
variety of human health problems, such as kidney and respiratory diseases. 
14. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 498. New York State spent approximately 2.5 million dollars 
to clean up and restore Quanta's site located in Long Island City, New York. The 
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") estimates that cleanup costs will range 
between 2 million and 4 million dollars per land disposal facility under the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 ("ReRA"), Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 
2795 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982», amended by The Hazardous and 
Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 6901-699li (Supp. IV 1986». See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 
supra note 12; Cosetti & Friedman, Midlantic National Bank. Kovacs, and Penn 
Terra: The Bankruptcy Code and State Environmental Law--Perceived Conflicts and 
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ing of hazardous waste}S The common purpose of these laws and regu-
lations is to place the liability for cleaning up the hazardous waste on the 
party responsible for creating or contributing to the hazard. 16 Some 
companies, however, have attempted to escape their financial responsibil-
ity for hazardous waste clean up by taking advantage of bankruptcy laws 
which allow a trustee to abandon property of inconsequential value. 17 
The law of bankruptcy consists primarily of federal bankruptcy acts 
and statutes. IS Prior to 1978,19 the main source of bankruptcy law was 
the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (the "Act").2o The Act provided several 
methods for relieving a debtor of his financial liability. The debtor could 
liquidate his remaining assets and distribute them on an equitable basis 
to his creditors, thereby relieving himself of further liability, or he had 
the option of extending these debts over a period of time.21 If the debtor 
chose a liquidation proceeding, a trustee was appointed to administer his 
Options for the Trustee and State Environmental Agencies, 7 J.L. & COM. 65, 68 
(1987). 
15. The public outcry over these toxic waste disposal hazards has spurred governmental 
action. The states, in exercising their broad police powers, enacted the first statutes 
dealing with hazardous waste. The states applied their police power to prevent the 
serious threat to the public health posed by environmental poisons, such as toxic 
waste. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE §§ 25100-25249 (West 1984); 
MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 1-301 to -305 (1983 & Supp. 1988); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. l3:lE-l to -116 (West 1979 & Supp. 1988); [d. §§ 58:10-23.11 to -23.11z 
(West 1982 & Supp. 1988); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 27-900 to -923 (Mc-
Kinney 1984). 
The devastating ramifications of the toxic waste problem also compelled the 
federal government to act. Congress, under its commerce clause powers in the 
United States Constitution art. I, § 8, cl. 3, enacted legislation concerning hazard-
ous waste pollution, its regulation, cleanup and cost. See, e.g., RCRA, supra note 
14; Toxic Substances Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (1976) (codi-
fied at 15 U.S.c. §§ 2601-2629 (1982». Congress has allocated 8.5 billion dollars to 
clean up all these hazardous waste sites. See The Superfund Amendment and 
Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986». 
16. See supra notes 14-15. 
17. See Klein, Hazardous Waste Liability and the Bankruptcy Code, 10 HARV. ENVTL. 
L. REV. 533 (1986); Note, Creditors'Rights When Federal Bankruptcy Laws Con-
flict with State Environmental Agency Enforcement Powers After Midlantic National 
Bank, 48 U. PITT. L. REv. 879 (1987). As of August 1985, it was estimated that 74 
hazardous waste facilities had filed for bankruptcy. See Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 498; 
U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 12; 4 L. KING, COLLIER ON 
BANKRUPTCY ~ 554.01 (15th ed. 1984); see also Mason v. Comm'r, 646 F.2d 1309, 
1310 (9th Cir. 1980). 
18. 1 W. NORTON, NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.02, at 1-3 to 1-6 
(Supp. 1982). 
19. In 1978, Congress enacted a new Bankruptcy Code. See The Bankruptcy Reform 
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. 
§§ 101-1330 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986». 
20. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed by Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 
2549 (1978) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1982 & Supp. IV 
1986»); see also 1 W. NORTON, supra note 18, § 2.01, at 2-1. The purpose of the 
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was to relieve the honest debtor from the weight of oppres-
sive indebtedness and permit him a fresh start. [d. at 2-2. 
21. 1 W. NORTON, supra note 18, § 1.03, at 11-7 to -8. 
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estate.22 The trustee would then convert the debtor's assets to money as 
expeditiously as possible in order to secure funds for distribution to the 
debtor's creditors.23 
The 1898 Act contained no specific provision governing the aban-
donment of property from the debtor's estate.24 Nevertheless, the courts 
did permit a trustee to abandon property because the courts found the 
abandonment of property by the trustee analogous to the trustee's power 
to reject executory contracts under section 70b of the Act.25 This com-
mon law rule allowed the bankruptcy court, when satisfied that certain 
property in the estate would not yield any benefit to the general estate 
because it was either worthless or overburdened, to permit the trustee to 
abandon the property. 26 
The trustee's ability to abandon worthless or overburdened prop-
erty, however, was not unlimited. The courts would not allow a trustee 
to abandon property when the abandonment would violate state or fed-
eral regulations.27 For example, in In re Chicago Rapid Transit Co. ,28 
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit decided that the trustee in 
bankruptcy could not abandon a leased branch rail line operating at a 
substantial loss because a state law required operations to continue.29 
Similarly, in Ottenheimer v. Whitaker,30 the Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit denied a trustee permission to abandon worthless floating 
22. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 44, 30 Stat. 544, 557 (repealed by Pub. L. No. 95-598, 
92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1982 & Supp. 
IV 1986»); see H. BLACK, BLACK ON BANKRUPTCY, §§ 91, 98 (1924). 
23. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 47, 30 Stat. 544,557 (repealed by Pub. L. No. 95-598, 
92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1982 & Supp. 
IV 1986»); see H. BLACK, supra note 22, § 180; 4 L. KING, supra note 17, ~ 554.01, 
at 554-3. Initially, all property of the debtor became property of the estate, but the 
Act provided that the debtor could apply state law to exempt certain property. 
Therefore, such property reverted back to the debtor. See Brown v. O'Keefe, 300 
U.S. 598 (1937); Rosenblum v. Dinfelder, 111 F.2d 406 (2d Cir. 1940); 1 W. NOR-
TON, supra note 18, § 1.03, at 1-7. 
24. Abandonment is defined as the exclusion of property previously included in the 
debtor's estate. 2 W. NORTON, supra note 18, § 39.01, at 39-1 (citing Brown v. 
O'Keefe, 300 U.S. 598 (1937». 
25. 4 L. KING, supra note 17, ~ 554.01, at 554-2; H. BLACK, supra note 22, §§ 189-90. 
26. See, e.g., Brown v. O'Keefe, 300 U.S. 598,602 (1937); First Nat'l Bank v. Lasater, 
196 U.S. 115, 118 (1905); Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Logan, 92 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 
1937), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 763, 303 U.S. 636 (1938); Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. 
Scales, 62 F.2d 582, 585 (5th Cir. 1933); In re Yalden, 109 F. Supp. 603, 604 (D. 
Mass. 1953). 
27. See, e.g., Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 500; Ottenheimer v. Whitaker, 198 F.2d 289 (4th 
Cir. 1952); In re Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 129 F.2d 1 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 
U.S. 683 (1942); In re Lewis Jones, Inc., 1 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 277 (Bankr. E.D. 
Pa. 1974); 4A L. KING, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ~ 70.42[2] (14th ed. 1978); see 
supra note 15 (state and federal regulations). 
28. 129 F.2d 1,6 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 683 (1942). 
29. Id. at 5. Nevertheless, the court did authorize the estate to reject the lease. Id. at 9. 
Thus, although the trustee was required to continue operations, insuring compliance 
with state law, he was free from the obligation to pay rent. Id. 
30. 198 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1952). 
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barges because the proposed abandonment would violate the federal law 
that made the obstruction of navigable waters illegal. 31 The court held 
that federal law preempted the judicially created abandonment rule.32 
Finally, in In re Lewis Jones, Inc., 33 a bankruptcy court issued an advi-
sory opinion that permitted the trustees to abandon certain property only 
on the condition that the trustees first use the assets of the estate to repair 
the potentially hazardous condition in order to protect the public.34 
In 1978, Congress repealed the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and enacted 
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (the "Code"),35 which included a 
provision allowing a trustee to abandon property.36 Under section 554(a) 
of the Code, a trustee, with court approval, may abandon any property 
found to be burdensome or of inconsequential value to the estate.37 This 
new statute contains no qualifications or limitations on the trustee's 
abandonment power, and thus fails to address environmental concerns. 
As a result, in a majority of decisions following the enactment of this 
section, the trustees were permitted to abandon any burdensome prop-
erty of the estate, including property containing hazardous waste. 38 
31. Id. at 290; see also 33 U.S.C. §§ 409,411 (1982). 
32. Otten heimer, 198 F.2d at 290. The court agreed with the debtor that the cost of 
removing the barges would exceed the barges' value. Nevertheless, the court denied 
the trustee permission to abandon them and directed him to remove them. 
33. 1 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 277 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1974). In this case the trustee of a 
bankrupt utility company sought instruction from the court concerning the possibil-
ity of abandoning certain underground manholes, vents and steam pipes that could 
become hazardous if they remained in their worn-out condition. Id. at 278. These 
structures could be made safe by repairing, filling and sealing, but only at a very 
substantial cost. /d. 
34. Id. at 280. 
35. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-
1330 (1982 & Supp. IV 1988)), repealing Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544; 
see also S. REp. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo 
& ADMIN. NEWS 5787; 1 W. NORTON, supra note 18, § 3.01, at 3-1. Congress 
considered this legislation essential due to the vast changes in modem society since 
1898, including changes in consumer credit and commercial financing. Id. at § 2.01. 
36 .. Section 554(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides: "After notice and a hearing, the 
trustee may abandon any property of the estate that is burdensome to the estate or 
that is of inconsequential value and benefit to the estate." 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) 
(1982). 
37.Id. 
38. See, e.g., In re A & T Trailer Park, Inc., 53 Bankr. 144 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1985) 
(trustee permitted to abandon waste water treatment facility in contravention of 
Wyoming state order to repair facility); In re Catamount Dyers, Inc., 50 Bankr. 790, 
794-95 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1985) (trustee permitted to abandon various barrels of haz-
ardous waste chemicals in contravention of an order by the Utah EPA to remove 
them); In re Stevens, 53 Bankr. 783 (Bankr. D. Me. 1985) (trustee permitted to 
abandon 29 barrels of oil contaminated with PCB in contravention of state order to 
remove them properly); In re Union Scrap Iron & Metal Co., 49 Bankr. 477 (Bankr. 
D. Minn. 1985) (court approved abandonment of scrap piles over objection of Min-
nesota Pollution Control Agency because abandoned property was burdensome to 
the estate). But cf In re T.P. Long Chemicals Inc., 45 Bankr. 278 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ohio 1985) (trustee could not abandon drums leaking sulfur monochloride, a haz-
ardous substance, since abandonment would violate federal environmental law, the 
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The Code, however, is not devoid of all references to state or federal 
environmental laws. For example, the automatic stay provision of the 
Code39 provides an exception for the enforcement of certain judgments 
obtained in a governmental agency action or proceeding.40 Similarly, 
government actions to compel compliance with toxic pollution control 
are not subject to the stay,41 thus demonstrating that the Bankruptcy 
Code can be preempted by other laws.42 
Another federal law addressing bankruptcy actions, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 959(b), also requires trustees to comply with state environmental laws 
by requiring a trustee to manage and operate the property in his posses-
sion according to state law.43 Traditionally, section 959(b) applied only 
to chapter 11 reorganization proceedings44 and not to chapter 7 liquida-
tion proceedings.4s Compliance with state law was required under a 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act 
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986». 
39. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1982). The automatic stay provision in section 362 grants the 
debtor immediate temporary relieffrom his creditors and prevents the dissipation of 
the estate's assets before an orderly distribution can be made to his creditors. See, 
e.g., Penn Terra Ltd. v. Dep't of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267, 271 (3d Cir. 
1984). 
40. Section 362(b)(5) of the Code provides: . 
(b) The filing of a petition under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title, 
or of an application under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protec-
tion Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C. 78 eee (a)(3», does not operate as a stay-
(5) under subsection (a)(2) of this section, of the enforcement of a 
judgment, other than a money jUdgment, obtained in an action or proceed-
ing by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit's police or 
regulatory power. . . . 
11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(5) (1982). 
41. The legislative history of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 indicates that Con-
gress did not intend that the automatic stay provision apply when a governmental 
unit is suing a debtor to hault violation of environmental protection laws. See S. 
REp. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 52, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD-
MIN. NEWS 5787, 5878; H.R. REp. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 343, reprinted in 
1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 5963,6299; see also Penn Terra Ltd. v. 
Dep't of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1984); Illinois v. Electrical Util., 
41 Bankr. 874 (N.D. Ill. 1984). 
42. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984) (a debtor may not avoid the 
provisions of the National Labor Relations Act by filing a petition for bankruptcy). 
43. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598,92 Stat. 2667 (codified at 
28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (1982». Section 959(b) provides that a trustee shall "manage 
and operate the property in his possession ... according to the requirements of the 
valid laws of the state." Id. 
44. See, e.g., Gillis v. California, 293 U.S. 62 (1934) (bankruptcy court was powerless to 
authorize receiver's noncompliance with state licensing statute regardless of conse-
quences for the business); Missouri v. United States Bankruptcy Court, 647 F.2d 
768, 768-78 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1162 (1982) (trustee in reorgani-
zation who was selling off grain was required to adhere to local licensing 
regulations). 
45. In a chapter 7 liquidation proceeding, the debtor surrenders all non-exempt assets to 
creditors. The debtor hopes to have the relief of a discharge. The trustee collects 
the assets, sells them off and distributes the proceeds on a pro rata basis to the 
creditors. In a chapter 11 reorganization proceeding the debtor does not surrender 
his assets but attempts to work out an agreement with creditors and interest holders 
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chapter 11 reorganization proceeding because the business was still func-
tioning in the state and deriving benefits from state laws. Conversely, 
compliance with state law was not required for a chapter 7 liquidation 
proceeding because the company had severed its connection with the 
state, and was no longer operating; it was being dissolved with its assets 
distributed to its creditors.46 
The conflict between the judicially created abandonment doctrine 
and federal laws prescribing the limits of a trustee's power to abandon 
property has become particularly acute in the area of hazardous waste 
control. In Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department of Envi-
ronmental Protection ,47 the Supreme Court attempted to clarify the pow-
ers of a trustee to abandon hazardous waste in contravention of state law. 
In Midlantic, the Court held that a trustee in a chapter 7 liquidation 
proceeding may not abandon hazardous waste material if doing so vio-
lates a state environmentallaw.48 Relying on principles of statutory con-
struction, the Court construed section 554(a) of the Bankruptcy Code as 
incorporating pre-Code case law.49 The Court reasoned that when Con-
gress enacted section 554(a), the pre-Code exception was incorporated by 
implication because the common law provided a restriction on a trustee's 
power to abandon property in contravention of federal or state law. so 
Furthermore, the Court concluded that cases decided after the enact-
ment of the Code proved that Congress did not intend to preempt every 
state law which limited a trustee's powers when it enacted the Code.S1 
The Court examined other federal statutes involving bankruptcy, 
to remain in business. Either an extension of time to pay in full, an agreement for 
part payment, termed a composition, or a combination of both is contemplated. 1 
D. COWANS, COWANS BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE 11 3.4 (1987). 
46. 7 Pt. 2 J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 66.04(4) (2d ed. 
1982); see a/so Austrian v. Williams, 216 F.2d 278, 285 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 
U.S. 953 (1954) (the mere collection and liquidation of assets did not constitute the 
carrying on of a debtor's business); Missouri, 647 F.2d at 768-78 (trustee in a chap-
ter 11 proceeding must operate the debtor's grain business in accord with state law 
as mandated by Code section 959(b». The court in Missouri doubted the applicabil-
ity of this section to a chapter 7 proceeding. Id. at 778 n.18. 
47. 474 U.S. 494 (1986). 
48. Id. at 502. 
49. Id. at 501. The Court noted that the usual rule of statutory construction requires 
that Congress, when enacting new legislation, expressly state that the new legisla-
tion changes a previously judicially created rule or doctrine. Id. (citing Edmonds v. 
Campagnie Gen. Transatlantique, 433 U.S. 256, 266-67 (1979». The Court cited 
three cases, Ottenheimer v. Whitaker, 198 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1952), In re Chicago 
Rapid Transit Co., 129 F.2d 1 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 683 (1942), and In re 
Lewis Jones, Inc., 1 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 277 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1974) as establish-
ing a pre-Code limitation on a trustee's abandonment power. See supra notes 27-34 
and accompanying text. 
50. Mid/antic, 474 U.S. at 501. The Court reasoned that if Congress intended to alter 
the common law doctrine and allow a trustee to be exempt from compliance with 
federal or state law it would have done so explicitly. Id. (citing Palmer v. Massa-
chusetts, 308 U.S. 79, 85 (1939) and Swarts v. Hammer, 194 U.S. 441, 444 (1904». 
51. Mid/antic, 474 U.S. at 502 (citing Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985) for the 
principle that a trustee in bankruptcy is required to comply with state environmen-
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and concluded that the abandonment provision of the Code was not in-
tended to preempt state and local laws. The Court noted that the auto-
matic stay provIsion in Code section 362(b)(5) affords state 
environmental laws great deference by allowing the government to pro-
ceed immediately in actions regarding its environmental protection 
laws. 52 The Court reasoned that Congress provided a specific exception 
for abandonments in section 362, but not in section 554, because the two 
concepts were treated differently in pre-Code judicial rulings. 53 The 
Court explained that section 362 was enacted in response to court deci-
sions which "had stretched the expanded automatic stay to foreclose 
[s]tates' efforts to enforce their antipollution laws."54 Conversely, the 
Court implied that a similar provision in section 554(a) was unnecessary 
because courts already required the trustee to comply with state law.55 
The Court relied on 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) to support its holding. 56 
This statute governs the management of the bankrupt's estate in a reor-
ganization proceeding by requiring a trustee to manage and operate the 
property in his possession according to the requirements of state law. 57 
The Mid/antic Court, however, found an implied willingness of Congress 
to extend the principles found in section 959(b) to liquidation 
proceedings. 58 
Finally, the Court also found that Congress has repeatedly pro-
tal laws prior to abandonment). The Court in Mid/antic quoted the following pas-
sage from Kovacs in support of their reasoning: 
Finally, we do not question that anyone in possession of the site -
whether it is [the debtor] or another in the event the receivership is liqui-
dated and the trustee abandons the property, or a vendee from the receiver 
or the bankruptcy trustee - must comply with the environmental laws of 
the State of Ohio. Plainly, that person or firm may not maintain a nui-
sance, pollute the waters of the state, or refuse to remove the source of 
such conditions. 
Mid/antic, 474 U.S. at 502 (quoting Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 285) (emphasis added by the 
Mid/antic Court). The Court also cited NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 
(1984), as further proof that a trustee cannot ignore nonbankruptcy law. The 
Mid/antic Court relied on a section of Bildisco which provided that "[t]he debtor-in-
possession is not relieved of all obligations under the [Act] simply by filing a petition 
for bankruptcy." Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 534. 
52. Mid/antic, 474 U.S. at 503-04; see a/so supra notes 40-41. 
53. Mid/antic, 474 U.S. at 504. 
54.Id. 
55.Id. 
56. Id. at 505. For a discussion of section 959(b), see supra notes 43-46 and accompany-
ing text. 
57. 28 U.S.c. § 959(b) (1982). 
58. See Mid/antic, 474 U.S. at 502 (citing Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 285 (1985». In 
Kovacs, the Court held that a state court injunction requiring a debtor to clean up a 
hazardous waste site was a "debt" subject to discharge under the Bankruptcy Code. 
After reaching this conclusion, the Court stated that "anyone in possession of the 
site . . . in the event the receivership is liquidated and the trustee abandons the 
property ... the bankruptcy trustee--must comply with environmental laws of the 
[s]tate of Ohio." Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 285. 
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moted the abatement of toxic pollution in recent legislation. 59 These acts 
served as evidence that Congress had not meant, by the unqualified lan-
guage of section 554(a), to overturn a well established common-law re-
striction on the abandonment power.60 Combining these diverse sources 
of authority, the Court determined that the trustee could not abandon 
the company's toxic waste material because it would be a violation of the 
state's environmental laws designed to protect the public health and 
safety.61 
Justice Rehnquist strongly dissented.62 He criticized the majority's 
interpretation ofthe statutes,63 as well as the case law,64 and attacked the 
majority's reliance on 11 U.S.C. § 362 and 28 U.S.C. § 959(b).65 Finally, 
he found the majority's opinion incongruous to the purpose of the 
Code. 66 
In reaching its decision in Midlantic, the Supreme Court sought to 
uphold the state law protecting public health and safety from "imminent 
and identifiable hazards,"67 because permitting a trustee to abandon such 
property tends to discourage rather than encourage proper handling of 
toxic waste.68 This holding is policy oriented, and although the policy 
59. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 505-06 (citing the following Congressional acts: Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (codified 
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982)), amended by The Hazardous and Solid Waste 
Amendment of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 6901-699li (Supp. IV 1986)) and The Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified 
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982))). 
60. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 506. 
61. [d. 
62. [d. at 507-17 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting, joined by Justices White, O'Connor, and 
Chief Justice Burger). 
63. [d. at 507-10. 
64. [d. at 510-13. 
65. [d. at 513-15. 
66. [d. at 514-17. Forcing the trustee to expend funds to clean up the property would in 
effect put the state's claim ahead of other creditors' claims. Justice Rehnquist as-
serted that Congress did not intend that section 554(a) hearings be used to establish 
priorities among creditors. [d. at 517. 
67. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 507 n.9. In footnote 3 the Court noted the serious threat to 
the public health resulting from the abandonment of the hazardous waste facility. 
[d. at 499 n.3. Specifically, the Court noted that because the trustee was permitted 
to abandon the property, relatively minor steps were not taken to reduce imminent 
danger, such as security fencing, drainage and diking repairs, sealing deteriorating 
tanks, and removing explosive agents. The trustee further aggravated already ex-
isting dangers by halting security measures that had prevented public entry, vandal-
ism, and fire. "The 470,000 gallons of highly toxic and carcinogenic waste oil in 
unguarded, deteriorating containers 'present[ed] risks of explosion, fire, contamina-
tion of water supplies, destruction of natural resources, and injury, genetic damage, 
or death through personal contact.''' [d. (quoting Brieffor United States as Amicus 
Curiae at 4,23, Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 
U.S. 494 (1986) (No. 84-801)). 
68. See Note, Bankruptcy Trustee's Abandonment of Burdensome Estate Property and 
State Environmental Protection Laws: Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey De-
partment of Environmental Protection, 55 U. CIN. L. REv. 853, 870 (1987). 
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behind this decision is laudable, it is not one soundly based on either 
precedent or statutory interpretation. 
Mid/antic involved a conflict between federal and state law.69 The 
federal law in question permits a trustee in bankruptcy to abandon any 
type of property that is burdensome or of inconsequential value to the 
estate, while the applicable state law forbids the abandonment of toxic 
waste material. 70 The Court attempted to resolve this apparent conflict 
between the Code and environmental laws by interpreting section 554(a) 
as including an exception to abandonment when state law applies.7l To 
support this position, the Court cited three cases as establishing a pre-
Code judicial doctrine limiting a trustee's abandonment powers.72 An 
analysis of these cases, however, reveals that they do not stand for the 
Court's proposition. The first case, Ottenheimer v. Whitaker,73 involved 
a conflict between a federal statute and a judge-made rule, whereas 
Mid/antic involved a conflict between a federal statute and a state law.74 
In the next case, In re Chicago Rapid Transit Co. ,75 the court permitted 
the trustee to abandon property, however, the terms cited by the majority 
in placing conditions on abandonment are only dicta.76 Finally, in In re 
Lewis Jones, Inc., 77 a bankruptcy court required the trustee to repair a 
hazardous condition before abandoning it only because of the judicial 
nature of the abandonment rule. 78 In short, these cases do not support 
the majority's position that an established judicial exception to pre-Code 
abandonment law exists.79 Even assuming they stand for this proposi-
tion, three isolated cases do not constitute the sort of settled law that 
fairly implies Congress intended to adopt the pre-Code judicial rule by a 
69. The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution article VI, clause 2 man-
dates that conflicts between federal and state law be resolved in favor offederallaw. 
It specifically provides: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be 
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, 
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the 
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in 
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. 
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
70. See Solid Waste Management Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:1E-l to -116 (West 1979 
& Supp. 1988); Spill Compensation and Control Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 58:10-
23.11 to -23.11z (West 1982 & Supp. 1988); Brieffor Respondent at 17-18, Midlan-
tic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986) (No. 
84-801). 
71. Mid/antic, 474 U.S. at 506-07. 
72. [d. at 500-01. 
73. 198 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1952); see supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text. 
74. Mid/antic, 474 U.S. at 511 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
75. 129 F.2d 1 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 683 (1942). 
76. [d. at 5. "Congress has not seen fit to empower bankruptcy courts with jurisdiction 
to determine the questions which confront state utility commissions in regulating of 
interstate utilities, such as whether a service should be abandoned or whether public 
convenience and necessity require continuation." [d. 
77. 1 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 277 (E.D. Pa. 1974). 
78. [d. at 279-80. 
79. Mid/antic, 474 U.S. at 510 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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failure to codify a rule to the contrary.80 
A second criticism of the Court's analysis relates to its use of statu-
tory construction. The Court reasoned that Congress had incorporated, 
by implication, the prior case law restricting abandonment when they 
enacted section 554(a).81 The plain language of this section, however, is 
unqualified, indicating that Congress did not contemplate making excep-
tions to the trustee's rights to abandon burdensome property.82 The lan-
guage of the section clearly states that after notice and hearing, the 
trustee may abandon any property of the estate that is burdensome to the 
estate or that is of inconsequential value and benefit to the estate.83 The 
purpose of the notice and hearing is to determine whether the property is 
burdensome or of inconsequential value to the estate.84 Therefore, once 
the notice and hearing requirements are satisfied, the statute provides the 
trustee the express power to abandon the property without regard to 
compliance with state or federal environmental laws.85 
An additional concern involving the Court's interpretation of Code 
section 554(a) is that the legislative history of this statute does not reveal 
a congressional intent to incorporate judge-made exceptions to abandon-
ment. 86 Had Congress intended to restrict a trustee's abandonment 
power in section 554(a), it could have provided for express exceptions.87 
For example, unlike section 554, the automatic stay section contains spe-
cific exceptions which limit its applicability. 88 Similarly, section 
1170(a)(2) of the Code provides an express exception which limits aban-
donment. 89 The lack of such exceptions in section 554(a) implies that 
Congress did not intend to limit the section's operation.90 
80. Id. at 511-12. 
81. Id. at 501. 
82. See supra note 36. 
83.Id. 
84. 11 U.S.C. app. § 6007 (Supp. IV 1986). The Advisory Committee Notes to this rule 
state that, "pursuant to § 554, the trustee may abandon property but only after 
notice and hearing." Id. 
85. These requirements are not difficult to meet, and if the trustee's decision to abandon 
clearly appears correct, the court may dispense altogether with the notice to credi-
tors. See 4 L. KING, supra note 17, ~ 554.02[4]; see also supra notes 36-38 and 
accompanying text. When the language of a statute is clear, its plain meaning 
should control. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485-86 (1917). 
86. See H.R. REp. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 377, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 6333; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 92, reprinted 
in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 5878. 
87. Cf NLRB V. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984). Congress knows how to 
draft an exclusion when it so desires, and its failure to do so indicates that Congress 
did not intend to provide for one. Id. at 522-23; see also Paige, In Re Quanta Re-
sources Corp.: Bankruptcy Policy V. Environmental Interests; A Polluted Judicial 
Theory, 59 AM. BANKR. L.J. 357, 365 (1985). 
88. Compare II U.S.C. § 554(a) (1982) with 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(5) (1982). 
89. Section 1170 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that "[t]he court, after notice and a 
hearing, may authorize the abandonment of all or a portion of a railroad line if such 
abandonment is ... (2) consistent with the public interest." II U.S.C. § 1170(a)(2) 
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
90. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 510 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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The Court found further support for the conclusion that not all state 
laws are preempted by relying on Bankruptcy Code section 959(b).91 
This section provides that a trustee-in-possession must manage and oper-
ate the property according to state law, thereby implying that state law 
takes precedence over federallaw.92 Reliance on this section, however, is 
misplaced. All cases prior to Midlantic applied section 959(b) exclu-
sively to chapter 11 reorganization proceedings.93 The duty in section 
959(b) applies only to the management and operation of a business in 
compliance with state law when the trustee is, in fact, managing or oper-
ating a business.94 In Midlantic, the waste processing facility was no 
longer in operation.9s The trustee was not operating or managing the 
company, but was merely in the process of liquidating and distributing 
its proceeds.96 The Court, while conceding that section 959(b) does not 
directly apply to abandonment,97 nevertheless inferred that section 
959(b) may include liquidation proceedings because the court concluded 
that ·"Congress did not intend for the Bankruptcy Code to preempt all 
state laws that otherwise contain the exercise of a trustee's powers."98 In 
effect, however, the Court created an exception to the abandonment rule 
without evidence that Congress intended there be one.99 
The practical effect of Midlantic will require an insolvent company 
to expend all its assets to clean up its hazardous waste. A better ap-
proach would be to distribute the burden of cleanup equitably between 
the debtor and the government. Although not specifically provided for 
in Code section 554(a), a balancing approach in a chapter 7 liquidation 
proceeding is appropriate because the substantial interests of an estate to 
excise burdensome property could be weighed against any competing 
public health and safety interests. This would allow a court to determine 
the most fair and reasonable result. 1°O This approach would require a 
court to weigh the following considerations: The imminence of danger to 
public health and safety; the extent of the possible harm to soil and water 
contamination; the amount and type of hazardous waste; the cost of 
91. Id. at 505. 
92. See supra note 43. A trustee-in-possession is one who is in control of the debtor's 
estate. 
93. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text. 
94. In In re Charles George Land Reclamation Trust, the bankruptcy court wanted the 
trustee to comply with state cleanup efforts, pursuant to Code section 959(b), and 
therefore refused to allow the waste disposal company to convert its chapter II 
proceeding to a chapter 7 proceeding. 30 Bankr. 918, 923 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1983). 
95. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 497. 
96.Id. 
97. Id. at 505. 
98.Id. 
99. Id. at 510 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
100. Id. Under section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 105 (Supp. IV 1986), a 
bankruptcy court has broad equitable powers to issue any appropriate order or judg-
ment. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 527 (1984); see also SEC v. 
United States Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434, 455 (1940) (applying provi-
sions of 1898 Act). 
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bringing the property into compliance with environmental laws; and fi-
nally, the amount and type of funds available for clean Up.lOl If a balanc-
ing approach is adopted by the court, the trustee could abandon the 
property on condition he take certain steps to clean up the site. For ex-
ample, some of the assets of the estate could be directed to this purpose. 
Accordingly, this approach would promote the environmental interests 
of the states as well as preserve some assets of the estate for distribution 
to deserving creditors. 
The potential impact of Mid/antic, requiring a bankrupt estate to 
expend its remaining. assets cleaning up its hazardous waste, has been 
diminished by subsequent cases that have permitted abandonment of 
hazardous waste by construing the Mid/antic holding narrowly and dis-
tinguishing its facts.102 The result in Mid/antic, however, may still have 
an impact on the business community.103 Companies handling toxic 
waste may have difficulty in obtaining credit from banking institu-
tions,I04 or they may have to pay higher rates of interest to compensate 
the creditor for its increased risk. lOS The issue then becomes whether the 
cost of doing business for these types of companies will exceed the re-
turns, which may result in a greater number of these companies going 
bankrupt.106 Furthermore, prior to Mid/antic, secured creditors' claims 
were protected because they were the first in line to collect their debts. 107 
Now, because Mid/antic limits a trustee's abandonment power, the estate 
may have to use its assets to clean up property laden with hazardous 
waste prior to abandonment, thereby reducing the value of the secured 
creditors' interests. 108 This result may leave an unsuspecting creditor 
101. See, e.g., In re Purco, Inc., 76 Bankr. 523, 533 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1987); In re Frank-
lin Signal Corp., 65 Bankr. 268, 272 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986); see also Buschman & 
Joyce, The Impact of the Bankruptcy Code on Environmental Disputes, A.L.I.-
A.B.A. COURSE MATERIALS 105 (1987). 
102: See, e.g., In re Smith-Douglass, Inc., 75 Bankr. 994 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1987) (trustee 
permitted to abandon property with environmental problems because it did not 
present any imminent identifiable harm to the public health and safety); In re 
Oklahoma Refining Co., 63 Bankr. 562 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1986) (trustee permit-
ted to abandon hazardous waste property because the trustee had taken substantial 
steps to alleviate additional environmental hazards and was in compliance with the 
state cleanup orders, and there was no immediate harm to the public health); In re 
Franklin Signal Corp., 65 Bankr. 268 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986) (trustee was permit-
ted to abandon 14 drums of hazardous waste because there was no imminent danger 
to public health and the amount of hazardous material was relatively small com-
pared with the high cost of compliance with environmental law). 
103. See supra note 102. 
104. Shanker, Bankruptcy Superfund For Some Super Creditors From Ohio to Midlantic 
and Beyond, 61 AM. BANKR. L.J. 185, 186 (1987). 
105.Id. 
106. A recent EPA study concluded that over the next 50 years, 25% to 30% of the firms 
owning disposal facilities will petition for bankruptcy. See U.S. GENERAL Ac-
COUNTING OFFICE, supra note 12. 
107. See 11 U.S.C. § 506 (1982) (secured interests under state law); 11 U.S.C. § 507 
(1982) (list of priorities). 
108. The trustee who now has responsibility for attempting to cleanup the site will be 
forced to use the company's funds to accomplish this task. As the company is insol-
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with the real burden of paying for the hazardous waste clean Up.l09 
The recent Supreme Court decision in Midlantic National Bank v. 
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection qualified section 
554(a) of the Bankruptcy Code by refusing to allow a trustee in bank-
ruptcy to abandon certain hazardous waste material because such aban-
donment would violate state environmental laws. Although the 
environmental concerns in denying abandonment were compelling, the 
language of the abandonment statute does not support this result. The 
optimal solution to this conflict is an equitable test that balances the in-
terests of the creditors of the estate against the environmental concerns 
resulting from a proposed abandonment. 
Laura Jacobs Margulies 
vent, the only available funds will be those held by the secured and unsecured credi-
tors. See Buschman & Joyce, supra note WI, at 103. 
109. The extent to which a trustee may recover cleanup costs from secured creditors 
holding a security interest in hazardous property is found in section 506(c) of the 
Bankruptcy Code, which provides: 
(c) the trustee may recover from property securing an allowed se-
cured claim the reasonable, necessary costs and expenses of preserving, or 
disposing of, such property to the extent of any benefit to the holder of 
such claim. 
11 U.S.C. § 506(c) (1982). 
